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Chapter 7
Securing Public Pension Promises
through Funding
Robert Palacios
There are several reasons to be interested in the way public pension reserves
around the world are managed. To begin with, many countries have adopted
a strategy of partial funding of public defined benefit (DB) schemes. For
millions of current and future members of these schemes, in dozens of
countries as diverse as Sweden and China, investment performance may
affect the likelihood that their pensions will be paid as promised. Another
motivation is related to the continuing debate over how to reform public
pension systems increasingly perceived to be unsustainable. The focus is
often not whether to increase the level of funding, but rather, the best
way to do so. The trend toward funding is partly due to growing awareness
of the implications of large unfunded pension liabilities. So, the ‘‘implicit
pension debt’’ does pose an intertemporal fiscal constraint and financial
markets will punish sovereigns that let it get out of control, despite the fact
that this is nowhere reported on government balance sheets. The increased
attention is also partly due to the fact that those who will bear the brunt
of the intergenerational transfer that this liability represents are starting to
protest.
Generating a higher funding ratio---defined as the size of pension reserves
relative to pension liabilities---is one way to mitigate these negative effects.
It can be achieved by reducing the liability (i.e. cutting benefits), increasing
earmarked revenues (usually, raising payroll taxes), or improving the invest-
ment returns of an existing fund. In many cases, reform packages include
two or even all three elements, increasing investment returns is clearly the
least difficult, politically.
Nevertheless, the record of public pension fund managers suggests this is
a strategy that often fails.1 Around the world, reserves in partly-funded,
public schemes have been used to subsidize housing, state enterprises,
and various types of economically targeted investments (ETIs). They have
also been used to prop up stock markets.2 And frequently, they have prob-
ably led to larger public deficits than would have otherwise been the case,
as money is simply channeled back to the central government, often at
below-market rates of interest. The conflicting objectives of government
or parastatal officials determining asset allocation have resulted in poor
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performance, measured by most reasonable standards. These decisions
typically occur in a regulatory vacuum and there is often little public
accountability or transparency.3
While proponents of centralized management may recognize the failings
of the past, they argue that performance can be improved by changes to
governance and investment policy, and they suggest that insulation from
political interference is feasible. The attempt to do this in some coun-
tries involves adopting the standards and practices of well-developed private
pension sectors, to the extent possible. Most reforms also envision an
increased reliance on private asset managers. Nevertheless, decisions are
ultimately made by trustees appointed by government and exempted from
the regulatory oversight that would apply in the private sector.
Are there ways to shield public pension funds from the kind of political
interference that has plagued them in the past? Is there a way to ensure
appropriate incentives for trustees to make prudent investment decisions
without the discipline of competition and independent supervision? This
chapter reviews some of the key design issues and policy alternatives that
would have to be addressed in order to answer these questions in the affirm-
ative. It also reviews initiatives in five developed countries---Canada, Ireland,
Japan, New Zealand, and Sweden---where new models of public pension
fund management have been introduced. From these experiences, certain
positive features of the schemes are summarized in a preliminary attempt
to arrive at practical recommendations based on good practice in this area.
The limitations of such an exercise must be kept in mind however, espe-
cially in light of the unrepresentative set of countries that has undertaken
this type of reform. With this in mind, the last section addresses the role of
country-specific conditions.
Policy Choices and Design Issues
Many of the issues raised in public pension fund management are similar or
even identical to those that apply to private pension funds. In fact, several
of the reforms described in the next section borrow directly or rely heavily
on the rules developed for the private pension sector. But the analogy is far
from perfect. None of the public funds examined here is governed by the
statutes that apply to their private sector analogues, nor are they under the
jurisdiction of the same supervisor.4 This is due to the fact that there are
considerations specific to public funds, ranging from their funding object-
ives to potential conflicts of interest. This section seeks to identify some of
the key policy choices by highlighting limitations that apply in the case of
public pension funds.
Pension Governance
In the broadest sense, pension governance refers to the: ‘‘processes and
structures used to direct and manage the affairs of the pension plan, in
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accordance with the best interests of the plan participants. The processes
and structures define the division of power and establish mechanisms for
ensuring accountability.’’5
General governance parameters are usually set out in legislation, while
detailed rules may be internal to the scheme in question. Public pension
plans are usually subject to specific laws that are distinct from those that
apply to the private sector. Responsibility is normally vested in a board
of directors or trustees. Many public funds use representative rather than
professional boards. Representative boards are often ‘‘tripartite,’’ namely
consisting of labor, employer, and government representatives. This usually
means that there are few if any board members with expertise in finance or
investment. Professional boards, by contrast, would normally include this
expertise.
In addition to determining the composition of the board and its manner
of selection (and dismissal), their specific duties might be clearly spe-
cified, especially as distinguished from management. In order to ensure that
incentives to perform these duties are robust, it is normally recommended
that those making decisions also bear a risk related to key outcomes. This
is one of the more difficult policies to apply to public funds, partly because
potential board members are unable to insure against the risk of political
interference that might significantly affect their ability to perform their
duties.6 In fact, government representatives may themselves be a source of
risk, due to inherent conflicts of interest.
There is significant scope for defining the role of management within a
pension scheme. In some cases, internal managers are limited to selecting
and overseeing external service providers. Outsourcing has become increas-
ingly popular in private sector DB plans, but most public plans perform most
or all functions internally. Whether internal or external, the responsibilit-
ies of managers should be clearly defined and the criteria for hiring and
compensating them should result in the appropriate skill mix. A practical
problem for many public funds is that human resource policies and salary
scales used in the public sector may reduce the potential pool of qualified
candidates for positions that are often highly remunerated in the private
sector.
Perhaps the most important problem to resolve in designing public
pension fund governance is the potential for conflicts of interest. Rules
involving personal gain at the expense of members can be made explicit
through codes of conduct. It is more difficult however, to avoid problems
arising from inherent institutional conflicts that often arise when public
officials are in a position to make decisions that may have collateral pub-
lic policy impact. A typical example is that the Minister of Finance may be
involved in decisions over asset allocation that can affect capital markets and
government borrowing constraints.
Well-defined information flows between board, management, and mem-
bers are essential to ensure that duties can be performed effectively and
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for the sake of accountability. The required frequency and type of inform-
ation required should be clearly documented. In the case of information
to members, it could be argued that standards should be higher for pen-
sion plans that receive mandatory contributions, including public pension
plans.
Funding Objectives
Perhaps the most obvious difference between public and private plans is
the extent to which they match assets and liabilities. Minimum funding
requirements are applied to private DB schemes, recognizing the dangers
of relying exclusively on the solvency of the sponsor. While definitions vary,
countries with minimum funding standards typically aim to have sufficient
funds on hand to meet accrued obligations at any given point in time.
By contrast, most public DB schemes do not follow these principles. Most
were set up with significant unfunded liabilities, partly due to transfers made
to early cohorts, as well as to the choice to begin with contribution rates
much lower than what would have been required to accumulate reserves
that matched accruing liabilities. When a government is a sponsor, the per-
ception may be that tax revenues could always be increased as necessary
to meet these obligations. Most public schemes did, nevertheless, build
reserves during their initial phase, and many have made it explicit policy to
partially fund future benefits in order to avoid a drastic increase in future
payroll taxes.7
The level of funding needed in public plans must therefore be defined
according to public policy objectives. These objectives will differ across coun-
tries (as seen below). The important point however, is that the target levels
should be explicit and well-defined if they are to guide investment policy. In
addition to fixing these long-term objectives, related tasks include determ-
ining actuarial and accounting assumptions, approving the appointment of
the pension plan actuary, and evaluating investment performance.
Investment Policy
The board of a pension plan is responsible for setting the plan’s overall
investment policy. Best practice dictates that this should be explicit and
in written form, reviewed periodically, and typically differentiates between
the strategic, long-term plan and the annual plan. The board may also
receive advice through external consultants or from a permanent advisory
council.
A plan’s investment policy is where targets are set for long run invest-
ment performance, risk tolerance, and the overall asset allocation strategy
with a clear approach to portfolio diversification. Often, exposure to spe-
cific firms, markets, issuers or sectors will be explicitly limited. Exposure
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to specific firms may also be limited for other purposes, related to the
corporate governance. In this regard, investment policy can also make
explicit a board’s position on shareholder activism, social investment, and
economically targeted investments.
Some public pension plans accumulate a large asset base relative to
domestic capital markets and public budgets. Consequently, the potential
for a conflict between the long-term goals of the pension fund and other
public policy objectives may recommend extra safeguards that would not be
found in private sector regulations in addition to the need to diversify. For
example, limitations on the amount of domestic government debt that can
be held by the public plan might be considered a prudent way to avoid the
temptation to relax fiscal constraints through coerced borrowing from the
pension.
While these are best practice approaches, many public pension plans
around the world lack this kind of investment policy. Most importantly,
public plans rarely state as their fundamental objective (whether enshrined
in the investment policy or not) that plan assets will be invested in the
sole interests of plan participants. Indeed many public plans allow or even
mandate that investments be made with other public policy objectives in
mind.8
Investment Process
Within the broader investment framework, pension managers develop a
plan to purchase and sell assets, implement this plan, and monitor the res-
ults. These results are then reported to the board and through them, to the
members of the scheme. Other things constant, there are no obvious differ-
ences between public and private funds with regard to the implementation
of a given investment policy. If anything, however, the standards of transpar-
ency for the process might well be expected to be highest in a public fund
that receives mandatory contributions from members.
A plan’s investment policy also lays out general approaches with regard to
passive versus active investment, external versus internal asset management,
hedging strategy, and other related topics. Implementing the strategy tends
to be left to professional managers who in turn, may use external managers,
brokers, custodians, and brokers. The method for selecting these external
parties and evaluating their performance is an important part of defining
the investment process and should be based on well-defined and object-
ive criteria. These may include, for example, level of fees, experience, and
expertise within certain sector, or with certain types of financial instruments.
It is imperative to keep systematic and accessible records as to the considera-
tions and arguments for selection. Likewise, investment decisions within the
scope of the overall asset allocation plan laid out in the investment policy
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are ideally based on objective criteria in line with the risk and return targets
associated with individual asset classes.
Well-run pension plans benefit from an objective and quantifiable meth-
odology for assessing performance over reasonable periods of time. Meas-
uring performance is a two-step process that begins with an accurate
measurement of results. This in turn requires the application of accepted
accounting and valuation standards that allow for reasonable comparison
with prescribed benchmarks. The second step is to compare these results to
an objective predetermined benchmark(s). This assessment may focus, for
example, on the net value added by internal or external managers, taking
into account risk involved. Independent and external performance valua-
tion can be very useful, especially where the resources available internally
are scarce. The consequences of the assessment in terms of retention of man-
agers and performance-related compensation can be explicitly described in
the documentation of the investment process.
Reporting and Disclosure
A well-run pension plan must provide information to those who control
and participate in the fund. For example, key elements of fund manage-
ment, such as the investment policy, can easily be made available to the
public. Performance, in terms of cost of administration, compliance with
the law governing the fund, and investment returns, can be through annual
and perhaps quarterly public reports. The veracity of the information can
be ensured by regular independent audits. If anything, the standards for
transparency for a public fund, where the liability of the board is usually
circumscribed, can be expected to be higher than those that apply in the
private sector.
Interdependence of Policy Choices
Effective policies in the five areas described above require coherent atten-
tion. The clearest example of the interdependence of these choices is
the relationship between governance structure and investment policy.
Legislation governing many public pension schemes often precludes the
formulation of a sound investment policy, even by the most qualified and
motivated trustees. Conversely, when a board is given more latitude, a weak
governance structure can influence investment policy.9 Studies find that
the key determinant of public plan investment is overall asset allocation,
an otherwise sound investment policy can still be undermined by weak
investment processes (Brinson et al., 1991).
Reporting and disclosure provide an important source of discipline for
private pension funds, but they are arguably of greater importance for public
plans. This assertion is based on at least two limitations regarding account-
ability exclusive to public schemes. The first is personal liability of trustees.
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Even in countries with a strong tradition in trust law, it has proven diffi-
cult to hold trustees of public pension plans to the same standards as their
private sector counterparts. This violates one of the basic tenets of good
governance, namely matching consequences with decisions. The second
limitation is more fundamental. Almost without exception, public plans
are not monitored by a supervisor with the objective of ensuring that the
interests of members are served. Unlike members of private schemes, those
forced to pay into public schemes do not receive protection from an agent
with sufficient expertise and access to information. Public pension funds
are therefore, to a large extent, self-policing monopolies.
This leaves only two avenues for accountability: representation of mem-
bers on the board, and at the ballot box (if that option is available). It would
seem difficult to devise an effective mechanism for selecting a well-versed
representative for members of a national pension scheme (as opposed for
example, to a scheme for civil servants or some other clearly differentiated
group). Some options could result in populist policies that undermine the
original funding objective; in practice, experience with representative pen-
sion boards in many countries has not been positive. The second avenue for
accountability, the electoral process itself, raises much broader questions of
governance given wide variance across countries.
In view of these limitations, the best and perhaps only source of discipline
for public pension fund managers is a public that is well-informed on the sub-
ject, which can assess whether the funds are invested prudently. Achieving
this level of public consciousness can be facilitated by civil society, academia,
and the media, but only if accurate reporting and disclosure is in place.
Recent Initiatives in Developed Countries
Next, we review the efforts to improve public pension fund governance, that
attempt to address each of the issues described above. Where possible,
the evolution of the proposal and the rationale for the ultimate design of the
schemes is discussed. Some key features are then compared across the five
countries.
Five developed countries have substantially altered their strategy for fund-
ing public pension obligations since 1997.10 Three of these countries,
Canada (1998), Japan (2001), and Sweden (2001), reformed existing fund-
ing arrangements that had not performed well over the past several decades.
Two other countries, New Zealand (2000) and Ireland (2000), launched ini-
tiatives for building pension reserves designed to offset the projected rising
costs in their flat pension schemes due to population aging.
Table 7-1 provides some background on these five countries. Sweden and
Japan have older populations, while Ireland has the youngest population
of the set. Japan and Sweden also have more generous public pension
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TABLE 7-1 Background Statistics for Five Countries with Public Pension Plan
Initiatives
Country
(Year Implemented)
Population
Over 60 (%)a
Public Pension
Spending
GDP (%)b
Public Pension
Fund Assets
GDP (%)c
Private Pension
Fund Assets
GDP (%)d
Canada (1998) 16.5 5.4 10 48
Japan (2001) 23.1 6.9 34 19
Ireland (2000) 15.5 4.6 None 45
New Zealand (2001) 15.5 6.5 None n.a.
Sweden (2001) 22.1 11.1 23 3
Notes
aWorld Bank estimates for 2000.
bOECD Social Expenditure database figures for 1997.
cFigures for Canada for 1998, while figures for Japan and Sweden are for 2000.
dOECD Institutional Investors Yearbook, 2000. Figures are for 1998.
Sources: OECD (1996); OECD (2000); World Bank population database; author’s
computations.
promises than do the other three. These two factors explain observed
differences in public pension spending relative to GDP, in the second
column. Meanwhile, at the time of the reform initiatives, Japan and Sweden
had already amassed large public pension reserves, Canada had accumu-
lated a significant amount, and Ireland and New Zealand had none. Ireland
and Canada had the most developed private pension fund industry and
commensurately large assets.
Canada’s CPP Investment Board
After an actuarial assessment revealed growing long-term imbalances in the
Canada Pension Plan (CPP), a debate ensued over how to ensure the fin-
ances of the scheme set up three decades earlier. The idea of moving to
fully-funded individual accounts was rejected, in favor of improving long-
term finances of the existing public scheme. A package of reforms sought to
smooth increases in contribution rates forecasted by government actuaries
in two ways. First, the contribution rate was increased from 6 to 9.9 percent;
and second, the CPP reserves were invested in the stock market beginning
in 1999 to obtain higher expected rates of return. This required a shift away
from the previous policy of automatically purchasing provincial government
bonds. Yields on those bonds were below market rates, leading to relative
low long-run returns for the CPP. There was also some evidence that the
captive source of credit available to the provinces increased government
consumption (von Furstenberg, 1979).
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The Act proposed to phase out these purchases. According to the ‘‘Brief-
ing Book’’ for the final CPP Legislation (CPP Investment Board (CPPIB),
2000): ‘‘The option of governments intervening in CPP investment policy to
meet regional or economic goals was widely rejected during public consulta-
tions as being incompatible with the interests of plan members. Accordingly
the Board and its responsibility to invested in the sole interests of plan
members are foundations of the new investment policy.’’ In keeping with
this approach, the new investment regime explicitly excluded social or eco-
nomically targeted investments. The focus was to increase equity holdings:
initially, it was decided that investment in domestic equities would have to
‘‘substantially replicate’’ broad market indexes of publicly traded Canadian
securities. This method was preferred because it reduced discretion of the
fund managers and because passive indexation was considered less costly
than the alternative. Foreign equity exposure was initially limited to 20 per-
cent, to be raised later to 30 percent, in line with restrictions on Canadian
private pension funds.
A key element insulating the funds from politicians hinged on the newly
created and independent Investment Board. In consultation with provincial
governments, the Finance Minister appoints the twelve members of the
board. The briefing book describes the process as follows (Government of
Canada, 1998: 37):
A nominating committee will recommend qualified candidates for the board of
directors to federal and provincial governments. Government employees are not eli-
gible to be directors. The Board will be subjected to close public scrutiny. It will make
investment policies public, release quarterly financial statements and an annual
report and hold public meetings every two years in each participating province…This
agency would be subject to ‘‘fiduciary duty to invest CPP funds in the sole interests
of contributors and beneficiaries---that is, to maximize returns without undue risk
of loss.’’11
The board’s members would be appointed for staggered 3-year terms and
would fulfill a set of criteria including:12
sound judgment; analytical, problem-solving and decision-making skills; a genuine
interest in, and dedication to, the CPP; the capacity to quickly become familiar with
specific concepts relevant to pension fund management; adaptability, including the
ability to work co-operatively with others (possibly witnessed in prior service on a
board, association or committee); high motivation, with the time and dedication
required to prepare for and attend Board meetings; ethical character and a commit-
ment to serving the public, preferably with a sensitivity to the public environment
in which the CPP operates; and strong communications skills.
Regarding the qualifications of the financial experts, these would include:
‘‘experience in a senior capacity in the financial industry; broad investment
knowledge (e.g., securities and financial markets); experience as a chief
financial officer or treasurer of a large corporation or government entity;
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consulting experience in the pension area; and generally recognized accred-
itation as an investment professional (e.g., CFA, MBA, training in economics
or finance).’’ Since the objective was to increase returns, the method of
achieving this was to impose private sector portfolio criteria on the public
fund, and to place the professional Board at arms’ length from the govern-
ment. Regarding investment rules, the government noted that most of these
were taken from the Pension Benefits Standards Act. In other words, the
existing regulatory framework for a well-developed private pension sector
was the basis for the rules of the Investment Board.
Perhaps the most controversial of the private pension rules adopted for
the CPP was the foreign investment limit which initially allowed up to 20
percent (rising to 30 percent by 2001) of the portfolio to be invested in
foreign assets. Labor party politicians argued that the entire pool of CPP
investments should remain in Canada to stimulate economic development.
But reformers eventually succeeded in obtaining the same portfolio limits
on foreign investment as applied to the private sector.
Investing in the market index investing was another way of avoiding polit-
ical discussions over investment choices or potential conflicts of interest. If
stock picking was disallowed, there would be little scope for political consid-
erations to influence investment policy. At the same time, it was recognized
that the size of the fund, combined with a lack of flexibility, might distort
the market if other players were able to anticipate CPP investments. Also, it
was pointed out that tracking the index could involve higher turnover than
a buy and hold strategy, as the index weightings changed over short periods
of time. Ultimately, the wording in the regulations allowed room for some
active management.
These measures were intended to produce CPP investment policies that
approximated what was found in the private sector. This comparison was pos-
sible because there was a significant private pension sector with a long track
record to use as a benchmark. The existence of a large contractual savings
sector, including close to 40 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in
pension assets alone, was an important consideration for the reform. At
its peak, CPP reserves were still expected to be smaller than those held in
private pension funds. Another consideration was the absorption capacity
of capital markets, which were deemed well developed and able to absorb
CPP investments. Analysts found that the projected flows of new CPP funds
into equities would not overwhelm the supply of new issues, especially given
that foreign investment option was available.
Another focus during the design phase was the issue of corporate gov-
ernance. The CPPIB potentially would be in a position to exercise its
shareholder voting power over Canada’s leading corporations. One option
was to agree to abstain from using this power. Instead, the government
chose to retain voting privileges in order to be able to take advantage of
its ‘‘voice’’ as an investor, in the same way as other institutional investors in
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Canada. This was the background for the ultimate passage of the Canada
Pension Plan Investment Board Act that came into force in 1998, which
appointed a Board of Directors and launched a new Corporation. The Act
clearly stated that the Board’s objectives were:
(a) to manage any amounts that are transferred to it under section 111 of the Canada
Pension Plan in the best interests of the contributors and beneficiaries under that
Act; and (b) to invest its assets with a view to achieving a maximum rate of return,
without undue risk of loss, having regard to the factors that may affect the funding
of the Canada Pension Plan and the ability of the Canada Pension Plan to meet its
financial obligations.
The process of nomination and appointment of this Board deserves spe-
cial attention. Ministers of Finance from each of the nine participating
provinces and the federal government select individuals (public and private
sector) responsible for the nomination process. Next, this nominating com-
mittee recommends individuals that meet the criteria for Board members
as laid out in the Act. The Minister of Finance of Canada then appoints the
Board, consisting of twelve members, from those on this list. This unique
arrangement has the advantage distancing the Minister of Finance and
the Board. Terms are staggered with half of the directors serving 2-year
terms and the remainder serving 3-year terms. Each can be reappointed for
another 3-year term with a maximum of three terms or 9 years. The Chair
can serve a fourth term. Members must agree to uphold a code of conduct
and must disclose any potential conflicts of interest.
Reporting requirements include, (i) an annual independent audit,13
(ii) annual report, (iii) quarterly financial statements, and (iv) and public
meetings in each province at least once every 2 years. In addition, the Fin-
ance Minister is required to initiate a special examination of management
practices at least once every 6 years.
The CPPIB’s investment policy flows from its stated objective to increase
the funding ratio for the CPP from 8 to 20 percent by 2017. It also has
made clear the target long-term rate of return is 4 percent in real terms.
In order to achieve these targets, and in light of the CPP’s historical invest-
ment in provincial bonds, the Board decided to invest new funds exclusively
in equities. All asset management is done through external managers.14
Initially, domestic equity holdings were concentrated in index funds replic-
ating the Toronto Stock Exchange index; foreign equity holdings similarly
focused on S&P 500 and MSCI EAFE index funds. By 2002 however, the
Board had shifted its asset mix in favor of private equity funds. On a com-
mitment basis, these represented about 17 percent of total assets of the fund,
but only 3 percent on the basis of actual investment. The Investment State-
ment from April 2002 shown in Table 7-2, includes minimum and maximum
investment shares.
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TABLE 7-2 Permitted Investments by the CPPIB
Investment Activity Minimum (%) Maximum (%)
Public equities of which
Canada 45 75
US 5 25
Other 5 25
Total 75 100
Private equities 0 10
Total equities 85 100
Real assetsa 0 5
Nominal fixed income/cash 0 10
Foreign currency 10 35
Note: aIncludes (i) real estate, (ii) natural resources, and (iii) real
return bonds.
Source: Adapted from CPPIB Investment Statement, April, 2002.
Between year end 1998 and the first quarter of 2002, the fund had accu-
mulated around 14 billion Canadian dollars, or about 1.3 percent of GDP.
First-year returns were tremendous, driven by passive equity investments dur-
ing a period of rapid international equity appreciation. Regulations allowed
for some active equity investment in 2000. The Board decided to reduce
its exposure to one particular firm, having what was perceived to be an
excessively high weight in the overall Canadian equity portfolio. This policy
allowed the CPPIB to outperform the index, as this particular stock had
declined precipitously by March 2001.15 After 40 percent returns in 2000,
the decline in global equity markets in 2001 led to a negative return of about
9 percent for a cumulative annualized return of 14.8 percent. Administrative
costs fell from 31 to 11 basis points between 2000 and 2001.
Ireland’s National Pension Reserve
The Irish Pensions Board (IPB) issued a major pension policy report in
May 1998, that recommended expanding voluntary private pension cover-
age through increased incentives, and an increase in the flat benefit which
constituted Ireland’s first pillar that had fallen over time relative to average
income (IPB, 1998). To control future contribution rates as the country
ages, and to reduce intergenerational transfers, the report recommended
partial funding of the flat benefit. The projections suggested that the con-
tribution rate with partial funding would have to increase from 4.84 to
6.24 percent, while the no-funding scenario would require an increase to
9.25 percent. The option of mandating private pension coverage towards
the same objective was debated but ultimately rejected.
“chap07” — 2003/6/4 — page 128 — #13
128 Robert Palacios
This new fund was to be set up with an independent managing body with
statutory responsibility for investing solely for the purpose of maximizing
returns; social investments were explicitly disallowed. In addition, the gov-
erning board was prohibited from investing in domestic government bonds,
to avoid the temptation of increasing government consumption using a
captive source of credit. In 1999, Minister of Finance Charlie McCreevy
announced that the Government had extended the new funding strategy
to public employees pensions as well. The combined package created a
Social Welfare Pension Reserve Fund and a Public Service Pension Fund,
into which budget surpluses totaling 1 percent of GDP were to be deposited
annually through 2055. This contribution would not be discretionary and
funding levels would be assessed periodically in actuarial reviews.
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By 2001, the fund held approximately 7.5 billion Euros, or about
5.3 percent of Ireland’s GDP.16 The fund is controlled by a seven-member
Commission independent from the national government, which works to
maximize returns subject to a prudent level of risk. The initial investment
policy adopted by the Commission was developed with the assistance of
international consultants and is described in Table 7-3. The National Treas-
ury Management Agency (NTMA) was designated as manager for the first
10 years, which in turn contracts out to private asset managers. Within this
framework, the NTMA was seen as a manager of managers, on behalf of the
Commission. The Commission did delegate the NTMA as the manager of
the passive bond portfolio of the fund. So external managers manage about
85 percent of the total fund assets. The selection criteria for external man-
agers were embedded in a tender process subject to certain European Union
directives. In a two-step process, 600 applications were initially received from
200 investment managers, with 93 percent coming from outside of Ireland.
Subsequently, three candidates were selected from a short list where criteria
were scored quantitatively with regard to specific asset classes. The NTMA
is responsible for monitoring the asset managers against a predefined set
of benchmark indices. They report to the Commission regularly on the
TABLE 7-3 Irish National Pension Reserve Fund Asset Allocation Strategy
2001
Major Asset Classes Overall Allocation (%) Share Passively
Managed (%)
Share Actively
Managed (%)
Equities 80
Eurozone (40) 27.9 12.1
Global ex (40) 14.2 25.8
Bonds 20 14.8 5.2
Total 100 56.9 43.1
Source : Maher (2001).
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results, and the Commission in turn provides an annual report to the
Irish Houses of Parliament, the Committee of Public Accounts, and the
public.
Japan’s National Pension Fund
Japan’s flat national pension (NP) and its earnings-related employee pen-
sion (EP) insurance programs were originally intended to be fully funded
from their inception in 1942. Benefits were subsequently raised and the
funding ratio gradually declined, despite increased contribution rates. Even
after a major reform in 1995 that reduced future benefit levels, Japan’s rapid
demographic aging and reliance on public pensions has produced one of
the largest unfunded pension liabilities in the world. Japan also has one
of the largest public pension reserves in the world. Therefore, the reform
legislation that became effective in 2001 sought to reduce liabilities by redu-
cing the accrual rate, raising the normal retirement age, and shifting from
wage to price indexation (Sakamoto, 2001). Another feature of the reform
was to change the way public pension reserves are managed. In the past,
a substantial portion of public pension assets was borrowed by the central
government in the form of non-marketable government bonds, and used
to finance government projects. The rest of the money was invested in a
combination of social projects (e.g. medical infrastructure, loans to mem-
bers) and capital markets, some of which was managed by the ‘‘Pension
Welfare Service Public Corporation’’ (PWSPC). A large portion of the funds
(along with Post Office savings) could be categorized as economically tar-
geted investments. There is also a mandatory transfer from the pension
plans to the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (FILP), which in turn
makes loans to public agencies, municipal groups, and the central govern-
ment. This allocation is determined during the formulation of the annual
government budget.
The magnitudes involved are large. In March of 2000, assets of the NP
and EP totaled about 34 percent of GDP. On the other hand, the liability to
workers and pensioners was estimated to be 160 percent of GDP, yielding a
funding ratio of about 22 percent (Sakamoto, 2001).
Figure 7-1 shows the evolution of FILP investments since 1955. The accu-
mulated loan portfolio was more than 80 percent of GDP in 2000, of which
around one-quarter came from the pension system. Over time, and as the
funds grew relative to the economy, the proportion allocated to support-
ing industry and providing infrastructure was reduced, in favor of housing
and social welfare spending including loans for education. Subsidies to
small-and medium-sized enterprises also increased over the period, repres-
enting almost one-fifth of FILP investments by 2000. Clearly, public pension
assets in Japan were used as a way to achieve a variety of public policy
objectives.
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Figure 7-1. History of the fiscal investment and loan program. (Source : Japan---FILP
2000; Financial Bureau; Ministry of Finance.)
Pension reserves were invested differently after 1986. The first change
allowed the PWSPC to use trust banks and insurance companies to man-
age assets, and by 1995, the proportion of total pension reserves invested
in something other than government loans has risen from 1 to 20 percent.
Figure 7-2 shows how this 20 percent was allocated in 1998: about half was
loaned back to the government through the purchase of bonds, about 40
percent was held in equities, and almost a quarter was held in foreign secur-
ities. The corresponding figures expressed as a share of the total assets of
the public pension scheme are about 8 percent in equities and 4 percent
in foreign securities. In total, around 90 percent of Japanese pension assets
are borrowed back by the government and used to finance public works
projects and other programs.
Not surprisingly, historical rates of return on these government projects
proved to be quite low. Between 1970 and 1995, the return was slightly higher
than the yield on 1-year Treasury bills and almost 2 percentage points below
the growth of income per capita (Iglesias and Palacios, 2002). Since pension
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liabilities tend to grow with wages, this differential alone accounts for sig-
nificant erosion in the funding ratio. Demographic changes and increased
benefits without corresponding increases in contribution rates explain most
of the unfunded liability.
The purpose of investing in private securities was to raise returns. At first
glance, the strategy appears to have been successful. As shown in Figure 7-3,
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Figure 7-3. Gross pension fund returns minus T-bill rates, Japan, 1970--97. (Source :
PWSPC (1999): IMF IFS statistics.)
returns relative to Treasury bill rates have risen since 1995. Nevertheless,
returns on Japanese investments from 1986 to 1997 yielded the same com-
pound return as the government loan portion of the portfolio, but with a
much higher level of volatility. This was due to the stagnation in the domestic
equity market during the 1990s, coupled with limited international diversi-
fication. The apparent improvement by the end of the period was due to
the collapse in short term interest rates, a temporary effect due to a policy
of holding bonds to redemption.17
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Besides poor historical performance as a motivation for moving away from
the old investment regime, Japanese economists have also complained that
many public projects financed by pension savings have been wasteful and
unproductive. The erosion of the bureaucratic dominance of the Ministry
of Finance in the wake of the East Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s may
have also created space for a shift in control of the massive fund. So, while
improving investment performance was a stated objective, the nature of the
final reform suggest that there were other factors at work especially in light
of the difficult choices facing the government on the liability side.
Since its inception, the Ministry of Finance effectively controlled pub-
lic pension reserves in Japan. This changed in 2001, when the Minister of
Health, Labor, and Welfare (MOHLW) became responsible for the funds.
At the same time, a new governance arrangement was created whereby the
MOHLW determined asset allocation in consultation with experts from a
Subcommittee for Fund Management, themselves appointed by the same
Minister. The management of the fund is now delegated to a three-person
board known as the Government Pension Investment Fund (GIPF).18 The
Chairperson is appointed by the MOHLW who selects the two other Board
members, subject to the approval of the MOHLW. The Minister sets the
overall asset allocation. As part of the process of formulating investment
policy, several restrictions and transition arrangements have been adop-
ted. First, holdings of domestic bonds must be greater than foreign bonds.
Second, foreign equities must represent less than two-thirds of domestic
equity investments. Third, holdings in foreign stocks must be greater than
foreign bonds. During a transition period of 7 years, the old loans made
through the FILP will be repaid to the pension reserves.19
The investment process is implemented by the GPIF, whose Board may
consult with a special committee of investment experts in setting its detailed
investment plans. The Board is responsible for selecting custodians and asset
managers and monitoring the performance of external firms based on stated
and objective criteria. Contracts with external agents are reviewed every
5 years. All investments other than domestic bonds are managed extern-
ally. The GPIF also sets the explicit guidelines for internal management of
the domestic bond portfolio. All shareholder voting rights are transferred
to the external managers. The GPIF Board must present independently
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okay audited investment results to the MOHLW who in turn must disclose this to
the Social Security Council, the Diet, and the general public, as part of its
supervisory function. Independently audited financial statements and the
auditor’s report must be published annually.
New Zealand’s Superannuation Fund
New Zealand is the only Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD) country that does not force workers to contribute to a
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publicly-mandated pension scheme. Instead, there is a general revenue-
financed, universal flat benefit provided to every citizen with 10 years of
residency since age 20, upon reaching age 65.20 The Government has pro-
jected that spending on this program will rise from the current 4 percent of
GDP to 9 percent in the next 50 years due to population aging.
In 2001, the government instituted a new funding effort by setting aside
funds over a 40-year period. The Ministry of Finance stated the issue clearly
(Government of New Zealand, 2000): ‘‘New Zealand’s population is ageing.
We need to start preparing now for the impending bulge in the cost of New
Zealand Superannuation (NZS) that will accompany this trend. By setting
aside some Crown resources toward retirement income now, while we can
afford it, we will be able to smooth out the cost over time.’’21
Initially, the plan was resisted by the two main opposition parties, the
Greens and the New Zealand First or National party. The Nationals favored
tax cuts in the short run and insisted on keeping open the long-term option
of moving to a system of individual funded accounts. The Government
opposed individual accounts, arguing that lower-income workers and those
with partial careers would not benefit equally, and that costs of administra-
tion could be high. The Green party held that the scheme was affordable
on a pay-as-you-go basis because expenditures on children would be lower
in light of population trends. It was also concerned about investment policy
and argued that criteria include social or ethical investment. Some Parlia-
mentarians argued that it made less sense to fund than to reduce the size of
the national debt (Cullen, 2001).
After a heated debate, the Superannuation Act passed in 2001 with some
compromises, including the inclusion of an investment criterion to deal with
ethical investment and a provision allowing for future consideration of the
conversion of the Superannuation fund into individual accounts. The New
Zealand Superannuation Fund (NZSF) has several unique and innovative
features. The first relates to the partial funding target, which is specified
indirectly through a formula that determines the annual contribution from
the budget. The formula is designed to generate a flow of annual contri-
butions sufficient to meet the cost of the program over the subsequent 40
years, subject to revised annual estimates. Withdrawals from the Fund are
expressly forbidden until 2020.22 According to one study, the baseline scen-
ario is for the Superannuation Fund to grow to around 6 percent of GDP
by the year 2020 (McCulloch and Frances, 2001).
Governance of the NZSF is entrusted to a public corporation known as
the ‘‘Guardians of New Zealand Superannuation Fund.’’ It is run by a Board
responsible for investing the Fund ‘‘on a prudent, commercial basis … .’’
Moreover, the Board is held to three standards:
(a) ‘‘best practice portfolio management
(b) maximizing return without undue risk to the Fund as a whole; and
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(c) avoiding prejudice to New Zealand’s reputation as a responsible
member of the world community.’’
The five--seven members of the Board are first nominated by a committee.
Established by the Minister of Finance, it must include at least four persons
with ‘‘proven skills or relevant work experience that will enable them to
identify candidates for appointment to the Board who are suitably quali-
fied.’’ The nominations are then considered by the Minister who must then
consult with political parties in Parliament before he finally recommends to
the Governor-General that the appointments be made.23
Once the appointments are made, the term of each Board member is
limited to 5 years, unless he or she is reappointed. The Minister may remove
any member from office for any reason that the Minister finds appropriate.
Members must adhere to codes of conduct as laid down by the Minister and
must generally behave in an honest and ethical manner, they must report
any conflicts of interest as soon as possible. Liability of members as regards
civil lawsuits and successfully defended criminal actions is indemnified and
such costs fall on the Budget. For the purposes of the indemnification,
members are never personally held liable provided the member acted in
‘‘good faith.’’ The Minister is further empowered to ‘‘give directions’’ to the
Guardians in writing, in a document that must be presented to the House of
Representatives and published in the official gazette. The Guardians are
obliged to take it into advisement and tell the Minister how they propose to
respond, to be documented in the Annual Report.
The Board lays out an investment policy and reviews it annually. The Act
does not set maxima or minima or impose any other limits or mandates. The
Board may appoint one or more external agents to manage the investments,
as well as a custodian. Performance reviews are required as soon as possible
after July 2003 and then again at a maximum of 5-year intervals. These
reviews are performed by an independent firm or person appointed by
the Minister. Following the review, the Minister presents a report to the
House of Representatives.
Sweden’s National Pension Fund
A key aspect of the Swedish pension reform of 1999 was the introduction of
‘‘notional accounts,’’ which are unfunded individual accounts where con-
tributions equivalent to 16 percent of wage are credited to members and
accumulated with interest until retirement (Disney, 1999). The notional
interest rate is set equal to the average growth of incomes and the notional
balance is finally converted into an indexed annuity, although during low
or negative growth periods, real benefits may be reduced. The concept has
since been adopted in several other countries including Latvia, Poland, and
Italy. There is also a new funded component in the Swedish pension sys-
tem. The contribution to this ‘‘second pillar’’ or Premium Savings Fund
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is 2.5 percent of payroll, with assets privately managed by asset managers
selected by members from among dozens of mutual fund options. In order
to control costs, recordkeeping and information flows are centralized, and
transactions are executed in blocks rather than at the retail level. There are
also complicated caps on fees charged by the mutual funds.
Sweden also instituted another pension change that has received less
attention, namely, the reform of management of public pension reserves.
This reform entailed the conversion of five existing funds into four new
entities with different governance rules and investment policies.24 After a
transfer from the old reserves back to the central government, the remain-
ing stock of reserves to be distributed between the four funds was equivalent
to around 23 percent of GDP.
Prior to the reform, different statutory restrictions on investments applied
to the separate funds. These limits prohibited investment in equities in the
first three funds and limited foreign securities to less than 10 percent of
assets in all five funds. Actual domestic and foreign equity holdings represen-
ted 23 and 9 percent of total assets, respectively. Fixed income instruments,
including government bonds, mortgage, and other bonds represented 60
percent of the portfolio. The rest was in real estate, direct loans, and cash.
The average annual compounded return between 1961 and 1995 was 2.1
percent, compared to 0.9 and 2.5 percent on short-term bank deposits
and income growth respectively (Iglesias and Palacios, 2000). The reform
created four funds of equal size. Each fund now has a board consisting
of nine members, two of which are nominated by employers and two by
employee organizations. Criteria for appointment exist but are vague and
would appear to allow for much flexibility; members are chosen based on
‘‘competence to promote the management of the fund.’’
Investment restrictions on these new funds are significantly less onerous
than those in the old regime. The objective was stated in terms of maximiz-
ing return subject to stated risk tolerances in the best interest of members.
Two important constraints on investment policy are a 30 percent minimum
required allocation to fixed income instruments with high ratings (low credit
risk), and a 40 percent foreign currency exposure rule for investments out-
side Sweden. This limit does not apply to investments where currency risk
is hedged. Finally, up to 5 percent of the fund can be invested in unlisted
securities.
The law further states that ‘‘there shall be no industrial or economic policy
goals in the management of the funds’’; nevertheless, it also stipulates that
investment policy should state how environmental and ethical considera-
tions were taken into account albeit ‘‘without relinquishing the overall goal
of high return on capital’’ (Government of Sweden, 2001). In order to pre-
vent these funds from becoming too important in the Swedish stock market,
a maximum of 2 percent of the market value of a Swedish firm can be held by
any of the four funds. In addition, voting rights are limited to 10 percent in
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TABLE 7-4 Reference Portfolios, Returns, and
Costs for Swedish AP Funds 1--4
(2001)
Percentage of Total Assets
AP1 AP2 AP3 AP4
Swedish shares 12 20 16.3 22.5
Foreign shares −o/w 45 40 32.6 40
Hedged 30 10
Fixed income 40 40 44 32.5
Real estate 3 n.a. 7 0
Return 2001(%) −4.1 −3.7 −4.2 −5.0
Costs (bp) 8 20 8 13
Source: Author’s computations from Funds Annual
Reports.
listed companies and 30 percent in unlisted venture capital firms. Table 7-4
provides data on the ‘‘reference portfolios.’’ While there is some variation,
the tendency is to invest about 40 percent in fixed income instruments and
50--60 percent in equities. Of the latter, between 60 and 80 percent are
foreign securities.
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With regard to the investment process, the new Swedish systems set
measurable targets with clear time limits for the purpose of monitoring
performance. It also requires that a minimum of 10 percent of assets be man-
aged externally. One fund, AP 2, contracted out management of 75 percent
of the portfolio, but intends to reduce this significantly. Another, AP 3,
contracted out about 25 percent of its asset management activities. The
funds produce reports that are audited and available to the public. As pub-
lic agencies, they are subject to Sweden’s ‘‘open government policy act’’
which demands a high level of transparency. The Ministry of Finance sends
an annual letter to the parliament reporting fund performance, drawing on
international investment consultants.
Finally, it is interesting to note that explicit attention was given to the
impact on the Swedish economy anticipated from these changes, and
provisions were made to mitigate them. In particular, the Government
recognized public finance concerns over the shift out of government bonds,
as well as the potential impact on capital markets through the potential
increase in demand for Swedish shares. Phasing in higher limits on for-
eign securities---starting at 5 percent and increasing steadily to 40 percent
for unhedged investments---was justified by concerns about pressure on the
exchange rate.
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TABLE 7-5 Indicators of the Five New Public Pension Funds (2001)
Canada Ireland Japan New Zealand Sweden
Assets in US$ (billions) 9.0 6.8 207.5 0.25 48.4
Assets/GDP (%) 1.3 5.3 5.4 0.5 22.9
Funding ratio (%) 8 n.a. 22 n.a. n.a.
Costs/assets (%) 0.12 n.a. 0.16 n.a. 8--20
Source: Author’s computations based on country Funds Reports.
Comparing the Initiatives25
Across the five country experiences documented here, three have long
experiences with funding their public pension systems, so their reforms
sought to improve on past performance. Two of the three---Japan and
Sweden---had very high levels of unfunded pension liabilities relative to
national income. Both also had very large reserves before the reform, while
Canada had a moderate level. Ireland and New Zealand did not have public
pension reserves before these initiatives.
Table 7-5 summarizes the key indicators and reveals large variation in the
magnitudes involved, in both absolute and relative terms. Combined assets
of the Swedish funds are by far the largest of the five countries relative to
the size of the economy. The smallest fund by this measure is the incipi-
ent Superannuation fund in New Zealand. In absolute terms (in US$), the
massive reserves in Japan subject to the new management system are by far
the largest, at over $200 billion, projected to reach $1.2 trillion by 2008.
The Swedish funds hold almost $50 billion, followed by Canada and Ireland
at $9 and $7 billion, respectively. New Zealand’s initial contribution to the
fund in 2001 comes only to about $250 million. The costs of administering
the funds range from about 12 to 20 basis points in the four countries where
data are available.
Tables 7-6 and 7-7 summarize key features of the country experiences
regarding governance and investment policy. Some important similarities
and differences can be observed. With the exception of Japan, there was
an attempt to create some distance between government bureaucrats or
line ministries and the pension fund. In Canada, this was done by appoint-
ing a nominating committee that is not under the direct supervision of the
Minister of Finance who ultimately appoints the board of directors. The situ-
ation is similar in New Zealand, where a nominating committee made up of
private sector and professionals with relevant background submits candid-
ates to the Governor-General. No such buffer exists in the case of Ireland,
although board members must have the requisite professional background
for the position. In Sweden, the Government must choose four of the nine
board members from among the individuals nominated by employer and
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employee organizations. Again, there is a requirement that members should
have relevant experience and background. Not included in the table is
the fact that the Swedish system incorporates a unique feature of limited
competition by distributing reserves among four separate funds.
The investment policy options available to each Board (and in Japan,
to the MOHLW), are subject to quantitative restrictions in each country,
except for New Zealand. The Irish reserve fund cannot be invested in
domestic government bonds, while 30 percent of the portfolio in Sweden’s
AP funds must be in government bonds. Canada’s main restriction is on
foreign securities that cannot be more than 30 percent of the portfolio; this
rule applies to private pension funds as well. The limits in Japan focus on
the ratio of domestic to foreign securities and are more restrictive than the
other countries in this regard. They are not statutory but rather have been
determined by the Minister in the process of determining the long-term
investment policy. Sweden also restricts foreign, unhedged investments to
40 percent.
Transition arrangements were necessary in the three countries that
already had funds invested. Canada allowed a gradual weaning of the
provinces off the automatic demand that the CPP reserves had provided,
while Japan gave the FILP 7 years to unwind the old loan program that had
financed public works for many years. The GPIF is required however, to
continue to underwrite FILP bonds. Sweden included measures that would
make the shift out of mortgage bonds more gradual, and limited foreign
securities in the initial years after the reform in order to avoid pressure on
their currency.
The Feasibility of Successful Centralized Funding
In each of the cases reviewed here, the decision to establish or reform a
public pension system was preceded by a national debate. In that context,
mandated individual account pensions were rejected in favor of centralized
funding; operating on a strictly pay-as-you-go basis was also rejected. The
underlying premise of the policy choice in each case was that, in each case
that with the right safeguards in place, public pension plans could avoid
the pitfalls of political pressure and perform at least as well as private plans.
Whether public plans will be managed effectively in the future is a crucial
question. There are at least sixty countries with public pension reserves
equivalent to more than 1 percent of national income (see the Appendix).
Globally, pension assets under public management are estimated at more
than one-quarter of world GDP, although this impressive figure is driven
primarily by United States and Japanese reserves. Nevertheless, a reason-
able estimate for public pension fund assets excluding these two countries
is probably around US$400 billion. The figure is likely to grow in the com-
ing decades. In addition to the five initiatives already discussed, several
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European countries have introduced new reserve funds or are planning to
do so. The Netherlands AOW Spaarfonds (savings fund) was introduced in
1998, financed by general tax revenues. Spain established a reserve fund
in 1997, although the first contribution was made only in 2000. A small
reserve fund was created in France in 1999 using privatization revenues and
a Central Planning Commission report recommended a much larger fund
be created (Leinert and Esche, 2000).
In several developing countries, public pension funds are already among
the largest institutional investors. There is increasing recognition that this
source of long-term savings has not been well utilized and that pension
system sustainability has been compromised. This has led to heightened
interest in reforming governance structures at existing funds. At the same
time, many countries facing imminent demographic transitions are con-
sidering whether they should create or expand reserves, in order to cope
with mounting pension obligations. China is an important example, given
its size and projected rapid process, having established a national social
security fund with the intention of partially funding its growing pension
liability.
Risks and Mitigation Strategies
Next we look at the risks of a funding strategy and the mechanisms available
to mitigate them; then we highlight the limitations imposed by country-
specific factors; and finally, we revisit the debate over the two approaches to
pension funding.
One obvious risk of funding public pensions is that state monopolies may
not have the type of incentives that lead to good performance. Government
pay scales may not attract good professionals. A lack of competition not
only reduces pressure for higher productivity, but it also eliminates a set of
benchmarks with which performance can be measured. These problems are
not unique to public pension funds, and policies designed to align incentives
for those running state monopolies have been tested with varying degrees
of success in different countries (World Bank, 1995).
Another risk is that government access to pension funds may allow it to
spend more than it would otherwise. Although difficult to prove empirically,
the view is based on the plausible idea that the availability of these funds will
lead to higher outlays. This is especially true when there is direct or even
automatic access to borrowing from the fund, combined with a budgetary
process that takes these resources into account when determining deficit
targets.26 In the case of Japan, for example, the FILP program is sometimes
referred to as the ‘‘second budget’’ and it is has clearly been a way to channel
funds to housing and education. This situation is often reinforced by fiscal
accounting standards that produce a lower net government debt figure when
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public pension funds purchase government bonds. To the extent that it
occurs, the objective of funding may then be completely undermined.
A third and related risk involves pressures to invest pension funds in
socially desirable or economically targeted projects. Mandates to invest in
certain favored areas are observed in many countries, with a predictable neg-
ative impact on investment performance. In addition, there is the danger
that certain investments would be excluded for reasons unrelated to maxim-
izing risk-adjusted returns. Examples include investments in companies that
produce tobacco or companies operating abroad that have labor standards
that are unacceptable to unions (Mitchell and Hsin, 1997).
A fourth risk is that investment policy will lead to distortions where funds
represent a large share of the potential investment pool. This is especially
true where volumes traded are low and the market is illiquid. Small changes
in the allocation of funds could move markets creating the potential for
intervention for example, for the purpose of boosting stock markets or for
supporting particular firms.
A fifth risk from having public funds investing in private securities arises
from having governments become shareholders. Corporate governance
could be compromised where a manager, influenced by other public policy
priorities, exercised his power in a way that did not promote the interests
of the firm or its shareholders. When the government is both owner and
regulator of these firms, the best interest of the members of the fund and
other public policy priorities may not be aligned.
The initiatives described in the last section included a number of safe-
guards designed to mitigate some of the specific risks associated with pension
funds and political pressures. The most basic ones---the investment mandate
and the governance arrangement---should also help to address the question
of competence and performance incentives. All five of the schemes have a
fairly clear commercial investment mandate that make them exceptional rel-
ative to the vast majority of public funds around the world. In addition, three
countries---Canada, Ireland, and New Zealand---have what can be termed
professional arms’ length boards, while Sweden has a hybrid arrangement
with a somewhat weaker professional criteria for membership. In Japan,
decisions continue to be made by a government official, albeit under the
tutelage of an expert advisory council. All five countries require high stand-
ards of reporting and disclosure, and except perhaps for Japan, all appear
to be proactive in their efforts to increase public awareness. On the other
hand, no country has been able to make those individuals responsible for
key decisions personally liable or subject to the same supervisory regime as
found in the private sector.
With respect to government consumption, the Irish fund prohibits invest-
ment in domestic government bonds.27 In the case of Canada, its inherited
portfolio was heavily weighted towards provincial bonds. As a result, the
CPPIB was allowed to concentrate exclusively on equities. Commercial
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investments, combined with the arms’ length governance structure, should
provide some protection against pressures to finance deficits, although
the Swedish 30 percent minimum rule runs counter to this objective.
The Japanese fund seems the most susceptible to this problem because
of its governance arrangement combined with its investment restrictions.
According to its reference portfolio, it must hold a portfolio of around 70
percent in government bonds, compared to the 90 percent for the overall
reserve.
It is interesting that all five funds examined here avoid mandates for
targeted investments and adhere to a commercial investment policy in prin-
ciple. However, as noted, there was some opposition to this in New Zealand
and, along with Sweden, there are some conditions related to ethical invest-
ment included in the legislation. The situation is less clear in Japan, where
there appears to be some discretion in this area left to the responsible
Minister.
The danger that the funds might be used in a way that distorts capital
markets is mitigated in Ireland and New Zealand through large foreign
investment shares. In Sweden, limits on shares in individual firms, along
with relatively high ceilings on foreign investment, would seem to provide
good protection, especially if the four funds truly operate independently of
one another. In all of the countries except Japan, the arms’-length Board
arrangement, combined with the commercial investment mandate, is an
important safeguard against a government that wants to prop up its mar-
ket or direct investments to favored firms or instruments. Once again, the
Japanese case is the most troubling in this regard. The size of the fund and
its direct control by a government official have already led analysts to suspect
that the government may intervene in financial markets.
In each of the five countries, the funds are instructed to employ passive
investment techniques for a substantial proportion of the equity portfolio,
applying a pure index fund strategy has not been adopted in any of the five
countries. The CPPIB began with a pure index fund approach, but it moved
to active management, partly to avoid overexposure to a specific firm, but
also due to its decision to move into private equities.
One way around some of the potential problems involved in domestic
investing, be it in private or public securities, is to invest abroad. Despite
sound financial arguments for diversification, even low levels of foreign
investment can be especially difficult for public pension funds if political
pressures arise to ‘‘keep the capital at home.’’ This has been the true in
Canada, where union pressure against foreign investment by the CPPIB was
strong. It does not seem to have been an issue in Ireland or New Zealand,
where investing abroad is an accepted practice. In Ireland, for example,
more than two-thirds of Irish private pension fund assets are invested abroad.
The relatively high proportion of Swedish investments allowed to go abroad
was a sharp deviation from the past policy that had led to a foreign share of
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TABLE 7-8 Subjective Assessment of Safeguards Against Political Interference
Canada Ireland Japan New
Zealand
Sweden Mitigation
Strategies
Safeguards in system against
Increased
government
borrowing
High High Low High Moderate CIM, P-AL-B,
Prohibition on
public bonds
Social mandates
and ETIs
High High Moderate High High CIM, P-AL-B,
Prohibition on
ETIs
Capital market
distortion
Moderate High Low High Moderate CIM, P-AL-B,
foreign
investment
Corporate
governance
conflict
Moderate High Moderate High Moderate CIM, P-AL-B,
foreign
investment
Note: CIM = commercial investment mandate.
P-AL-B = Professional, arms-length board.
Source : Author’s computation.
only 9 percent. Japan’s foreign exposure remains quite limited: 15 percent,
according to the reference portfolio. Given the size of the fund, this tar-
get will make it difficult to avoid distortionary influence over fiscal policy
or capital markets (or both). More importantly perhaps, it increases the
exposure of the pension fund to Japanese country risk and reduces potential
diversification gains.
To summarize this discussion, Table 7-8 provides a qualitative assessment
of how well each of the five countries addresses the specific challenges
for political insulation. The last column also lists some of the factors
that can mitigate these risks. Based on previous studies, it seems safe to
say that most other countries with public pension funds have not imple-
mented these safeguards and would generally receive a ‘‘low’’ rating in all
categories.
The Influence of Country-Specific Conditions
Time will tell whether the five reform plans discussed here will succeed. In
addition to the governance arrangement, investment policy and process,
disclosure and reporting rules, and other elements of design codified in
the laws, success will also be influenced by conditions in which the public
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TABLE 7-9 Indicators of Country-Specific Conditions for Public Pension
Management
Canada Ireland Japan New Zealand Sweden
Stock market cap. (% GDP,
1995)
64 43 72 56 78
Value traded (% GDP, 1995) 32 22 24 15 41
Foreign exchange restrictions None None None None None
Accountability ranking (out of
173)
18 9 35 7 4
Rule of Law ranking (out of
166)
10 18 15 8 11
Source : See the Appendix.
pension scheme operates. Such country-specific conditions include the
relative size of the capital market and its liquidity, the state of the asset
management industry and related services available in the country, restric-
tions on foreign exchange conversion, and most importantly, the overall
governance situation in terms of accountability of government, corruption,
and the rule of law. The countries covered in this chapter are also an unusual
set: they are rich, relatively well-governed countries, with certain favorable
conditions for implementing key elements of a successful policy. Table 7-9
below quantifies some of these factors.
The conditions in other countries with significant public pension reserves
are less conducive to success, especially poor and middle income countries.
For example, among the more than 60 countries listed in the Appendix, we
estimate that 36 have public fund reserves that exceed the value traded on
their stock markets. An even larger proportion does not have a functioning
bond market or does not issue government debt. The supply of debt and
equities can be increased through parallel policy measures such as privatiza-
tion, but the need to invest abroad in order to avoid the problems of capital
market distortion and shareholder conflict of interest is often inescapable.
For many developing countries with serious foreign exchange restrictions,
this option may be limited.
Table 7-9 does not reveal the availability of domestic or foreign asset
managers and other professionals. In the five countries of special focus
here, actuarial and investment experts are relatively abundant due to a
well developed private industry; however, these are scarce in most devel-
oping countries. Most public pension funds manage all of their investments
in-house and with local personnel. It is important to adjust pay scales in order
to attract these individuals and/or to hire foreign managers, but many poor
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countries are too small to attract much interest from providers. About one-
third of the public funds have less than US$100 million while about half are
probably below US$500 million.
There may be creative ways to deal with some of these issues and perhaps
lower costs. Some experts have suggested asset swaps to deal with foreign
exchange constraints in some countries (Bodie and Merton, 2002). The
risk premium that would be involved in such a transaction could make the
idea unattractive in some countries, and it remains to be attempted by any
public pension fund. Regional initiatives such as among the Francophone
countries may achieve economies of scale in several areas, including asset
management and custodianship.
Finally, there is the overarching question of governance. Here we refer
not to the Boards of public pension funds, along with their policies and
processes, but rather to the broader question of accountability and trans-
parency of government itself. In practice, even a well-designed system can be
compromised by extralegal action. Moreover, the only discipline for public
pension fund boards, not subject to any regulatory authority with limited
personal liability, is the public accounting that must be demanded at the
broad political level.
Some international evidence on the relationship between good national
governance and public pension fund performance is available. Figure 7-4
plots long-term compounded rates of return for twenty public pension funds
relative to bank deposit rates, against a measure of ‘‘voice and accountability’’
y = 144.19x 2 + 25.694x + 0.4897
R2 = 0.5463
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Figure 7-4. Accountability of government and public pension fund returns. (Source :
Adapted from Iglesias and Palacios (2000) and Kaufmann et al. (2002).)
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from the World Bank’s database on governance indicators. With only one
exception (Malaysia), countries with a negative ranking reported long-run
returns below those they could have achieved if the money had been held
in a bank deposit in the same country during the same period.28
Implications for the Debate over Publicly versus
Privately-Managed Pension Assets
The main alternative to centralized funding of DB plans is to intro-
duce privately-managed individual account defined contribution (DC)
plans. Critics of the centralized approach, skeptical about the potential
for shielding large public funds from government interventions, include
Barro (1998), who argued that: it is politically infeasible to have a pub-
lic program that is funded to a substantial degree. Large-scale funding
seems to be sustainable only in the context of privatized (though possibly
publicly-mandated) social security.
Yet many of the challenges for public funds also apply to privately man-
aged funds, including the general quality of governance. Only a public
entity can supervise private funds and the task requires a certain level
of competence and transparency. Also, in its role as supervisor and reg-
ulator, government can impose investment restrictions that may lead to
the same distortionary consequences as might have prevailed under dir-
ect public management. Finally, decentralization and competition implies
additional costs that can reduce the net investment returns perceived by the
members.
The option to manage funds in a decentralized manner does appear to
require a lower threshold of governance to operate, and it also introduces
a number of disciplining features that are absent from even the best cen-
tralized model. One advantage is that moving from DB to DC creates a
powerful incentive for members of the scheme to actively search out good
management and reward or punish those making the investment decisions.
In an open fund arrangement (where individuals have a choice of provider),
this is achieved mostly through competition as individuals ‘‘vote with their
feet.’’ Malfeasance can be sanctioned by a supervisor entrusted with appro-
priate powers and/or the courts through the assessment of liability. This
applies not only to the investment function, but also to recordkeeping and
other services.
A second advantage of individual accounts is the creation of well-
defined property rights. In a partially-funded DB scheme, the claims of
members are to a large extent on future taxpayers, some of whom are not
yet born. This muddles the meaning of the funding ratio, since returns
may be less important than political lobbying to ensure that future fiscal
priorities respect pension promises made earlier.
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In addition, problems associated with the government’s conflict of interest
when it acts as shareholder and institutional investor are largely avoided
through decentralization. There is still potential for a government to
use its regulatory powers to channel funds to certain areas (e.g. min-
imum investment in socially-responsible projects or depressed regions),
but it seems clear that this is more difficult to do if control of the
funds is out of the hands of someone appointed by the government
itself.
Cost pressures are likely to be higher in private DC schemes, although in
many countries, public monopolies are massively overstaffed and inefficient.
Marketing expenses can represent as much as half of the charges levied on
members in decentralized schemes and much of this is unproductive for the
economy as a whole. On the other hand, more efficient allocation of capital
in the economy is a potentially large externality, difficult to replicate with a
centralized model. There may even be a positive role for the private funds
in corporate governance under certain conditions. Finally, what matters to
the member of the scheme is the net investment return which is only partly
determined by commissions.
While both approaches involve major design and implementation chal-
lenges, it is probably more feasible in most countries to succeed in funding
through a private, competitive model than through centralized public man-
agement. One possible compromise solution would involve a centralized,
low-cost, default scheme with an opt-out provision that allowed for the use of
privately managed funds. This would impose some market discipline on the
public fund while putting pressure on private managers not to pass along
large marketing bills to participants. In countries with small memberships
and/or assets, the private options could be limited and the firms selected
through a tendering process. A key feature of this approach obviously, is the
shift away from DB and partial funding.
Conclusions
Our survey shows that many countries have adopted a financing strategy
that involves funding public pension promises. In addition to the normal
challenges of pension governance, public plans face additional obstacles
arising from the tendency of governments to interfere in the investment
process. In the last few years, five countries passed legislation designed to
mitigate these risks. Reviewing these cases, a number of ‘‘good practices’’ not
commonly observed in most public funds were highlighted. These include
(i) explicit funding targets and mechanisms to trigger action in the case of
deviation from this objective; (ii) commercial investment policies flowing
from these targets and aimed at maximizing risk-adjusted returns for mem-
bers; (iii) professional boards selected through a process that maintains
reasonable distance from government officials; (iv) prohibition on social
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investment criteria or ETIs; (v) significant share of investment done through
external managers selected by explicit and objective criteria; (vi) avoid-
ance of strict portfolio limits, especially on foreign investments; and (vii)
high standards of reporting and disclosure including annual, independent
audits, performance reviews, and codes of conduct for Board members, all
made available to the public.
By adopting these practices, public plans can improve their perform-
ance, thus increasing the sustainability of their retirement promises and
removing distortions. Country-specific conditions will always pose formid-
able challenges and may require difficult solutions, such as investing a very
high proportion of assets abroad. The most important constraint, however,
is likely to be the broader condition of national governance. Ultimately, even
the most resilient and well-considered design for a national pension plan
can be compromised if there is no way to hold the sponsor accountable.
Notes
1For a review of the international evidence from many countries, see Iglesias and
Palacios (2000).
2For example, the press reported that Taiwan’s government used ‘‘massive gov-
ernment intervention with large purchases by government pension and insurance
funds’’ to prop up the stock market in 1999 (Wall Street Journal, 1999).
3Of course, private management in a decentralized and competitive system need
not guarantee good results. Private fund managers must be supervised closely,
especially when contributions are mandated, thus raising the implicit (or some-
times explicit) liability of the state vis-à-vis their performance. In addition, the
regulatory climate and in particular, investment rules and restrictions imposed on
private managers can ultimately obviate the advantages of better incentives and
competition. Finally, the cost of administration may be higher in a decentralized
system.
4Although not discussed in this chapter, an interesting exception to this rule is found
in Costa Rica where the Superintendency of Pensions regulates both fully funded,
private pensions and a partially-funded, public scheme. However, its role is still not
clearly defined with respect to the latter.
5Association of Canadian Pension Management (ACPM, 1997: 4).
6In the United States, the Thrift Savings Plan (TSP), a DC scheme for Federal civil
servants, provides an example of this problem in the case of a public scheme. Passage
of the legislation creating the TSP was significantly delayed due to reluctance of
potential trustees to assume liability. Ultimately, Congress granted exemptions from
liability (Schreitmuller, 1987).
AQ: Schreit-
muller,
1987 not
listed. Pls.
check.
7In the 1960s and 1970s, many developing countries in Latin America and
Africa adopted the scaled premium approach where partial funding was aimed at
maintaining target long-term contribution rates.
8For a variety of real world examples, see Iglesias and Palacios (2000).
9Useem and Hess (1999) and Mitchell and Hsin (1997) present empirical evidence
AQ: Useem
and Hess
1999 not
listed. Pls
check.
of the influence of governance structure on asset allocation in US public pension
plans at the state level.
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10Another interesting example is the Norwegian Petroleum Fund. While not a pen-
sion fund per se, the assets have been explicitly earmarked to deal with the impact of
population aging.
11Government of Canada (1998: 37).
12‘‘Gender’’ representation was included among the criteria.
13The external auditor reviews internal controls every 6 months, although this is not
required.
14Other services, such as custody, performance measurement, and investment
accounting services are also provided externally by State Street Trust.
15CPPIB (2001).
16Most of this consisted of proceeds from a Telecom privatization earmarked for this
purpose.
17Usuki (2002) points out that returns between 1995 and 2000 were slightly better
than comparable market indices.
18This terminology is taken from Usuki (2001). Sakamoto (2001) refers to this as
the Investment Fund of Social Security Reserves (IFSSR).
19In the future, bonds will be issued by FILP to support public projects.
20The idea of introducing a mandatory, funded retirement savings scheme was rejec-
ted in a referendum by what could fairly be termed a consensus of 97 percent of
voters.
21Government of New Zealand (2000) (Executive Summary).
22The Government determined that transfers to the Fund would total 600 million
NZ$ in 2001--02, 1,200 million in 2002--03, and 1,800 million in 2003--04. However,
until the Fund is fully established and operating in 2002, it will earn the interest rate
on short-term bank deposits.
23The nominating committee, appointed by the Minister of Finance in 2001, has
members including the Chief Executive of the Investment Savings and Insurance
Association, the Chairman of the First State Property Trust, a chartered accountant,
a member of the Securities Commission, and the Executive Director of New Zealand
Businesses for Social Responsibility.
24The new system also includes two more public funds. The first is a residual scheme
from the old system that invests in small and medium sized enterprises in Sweden. It
is relatively small. The second is the default fund for individuals who do not express
their choice of private fund manager for their fully-funded, ‘‘Premium’’ pensions.
25Legislation for the three Anglophone countries can be found as follows:
Ireland: <http://www.ntma.ie/Publications/Pen_Res_Fund_Act_2000.pdf>.
New Zealand: <http://www.treasury.govt.nz/release/super/#15October>.
Canada: <www.cppib.ca/>.
26See Buchanan (1990) for a discussion in the US context.
27In its first year of its operation, critics asked to defer its mandated contribution to
the fund. New Zealand’s finance minister was also approached on this topic, even
before the fund began to operate.
28To place this result in context, the accountability ranking is also included for the
sixty-five countries listed in Appendix. Roughly half of the countries with public
pension reserves, and about three-quarters of developing countries in the table,
have negative rankings. In the global sample, the only non-OECD country among
the top twenty (out of 173 countries) is Mauritius.
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APPENDIX
TABLE A-1 Public Pension Reserves in Selected Countries
Reserves Relative to Reserves in
US dollars
(millions)
Board
Composition
Voice and
Accountability
Year GDP Traded Shares
(%) (%)
SWITZERLAND 1998 5.7 5.9 15,000 Tripartite 1.73
FINLAND 2000 7.3 48 9,400 Tripartite 1.69
SWEDEN 2001 22.9 56.1 48,000 Tripartite 1.65
NETHERLANDS 2000 31 49.4 Tripartite 1.61
DENMARK 2000 18.8 124 30,483 Tripartite 1.60
NEW ZEALAND 2001 0.5 3.5 252 Professional 1.59
IRELAND 2001 5.3 24.4 6,600 Professional 1.57
COSTA RICA 2001 8.2 1,326 Tripartite 1.37
CANADA 2001 1.3 4.1 9,032 Professional 1.33
MAURITIUS 2000 17.5 971.4 686 Tripartite 1.27
UNITED STATES 2000 9.4 12.8 9,31,000 Government 1.24
SOUTH AFRICA 2000 19.2 153 27,573 Tripartite 1.17
JAPAN 2000 5.4 24 16,70,224 Government 1.03
KOREA, SOUTH 2000 12 29.5 54,866 Tripartite 0.98
GUYANA 2000 10.7 0.94
CAPE VERDE 2000 10 58 Government 0.92
BOTSWANA 2001 0.80
JAMAICA 1999 5.7 74 392 Tripartite 0.78
PANAMA 2000 0.77
INDIA 1998 4.1 97.6 17,515 Tripartite 0.66
TRINIDAD AND 1999 11.1 427 762 0.61
TOBAGO
PHILIPPINES 1998 11.2 56.3 7,324 Tripartite 0.53
BENIN 2000 none Tripartite 0.47
THAILAND 2000 2.8 8.2 3,000 Tripartite 0.37
NAMIBIA 2000 37.5 1,254 Tripartite 0.32
MALI 2000 none Tripartite 0.32
MADAGASCAR 2000 none Tripartite 0.28
SENEGAL 1998 1.3 none 59 Tripartite 0.12
MEXICO 2000 n.a. 0.12
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TABLE A-1 Continued.
Reserves Relative to Reserves in
US dollars
Board
Composition
Voice and
Accountability
Year GDP Traded Shares (millions)
(%) (%)
SINGAPORE 2000 55.6 77 51,411 Government 0.11
NIGER 2000 n.a. none Tripartite 0.11
JORDAN 1996 16.9 164.1 1,186 0.10
GHANA 1995 9.4 3,142.2 371 Tripartite 0.02
PAPUA NEW 2000 6.9 263 −0.03
GUINEA
HONDURAS 1994 3.4 104.2 118 −0.04
NEPAL 1997 4.7 1,169.8 226 Government −0.06
NICARAGUA 1996 3.2 none 61 −0.06
TANZANIA 1995 0.9 37 Tripartite −0.07
MALAYSIA 2000 54.4 60.4 48,591 Tripartite −0.13
SRI LANKA 1998 15.8 930.3 2,498 Tripartite −0.23
MOROCCO 1999 9.6 367.7 3,347 Tripartite −0.23
LEBANON 2000 7.2 1,000 Government −0.32
GUATEMALA 1995 1.7 249 −0.33
INDONESIA 2000 2.8 38.4 3,690 −0.40
COLOMBIA 2000 3.6 225 2,932 Tripartite −0.41
NIGERIA 1998 1.2 1,233 160 Tripartite −0.44
TUNISIA 2000 5.7 154.6 1,114 Tripartite −0.61
YEMEN 1999 1 none −0.63
EGYPT 1998 33.1 2,364.3 27,361 −0.65
KENYA 1995 12.1 1,732.8 929 Tripartite −0.68
GAMBIA 1995 11.1 38 Tripartite −0.73
UGANDA 2000 1 27 Tripartite −0.79
MALDIVES 1999 1.5 none −0.81
CAMEROON 2000 Tripartite −0.82
ETHIOPIA 1997 1.4 98 Government −0.85
CHAD 1999 0.3 none 4 Tripartite −0.88
ZIMBABWE 1999 1.8 none 85 Tripartite −0.90
SWAZILAND 1995 6.6 none 70 Tripartite −0.93
SAUDI ARABIA 2000 135.2 none 2,34,000 Government −1.07
CHINA 2001 2 27.6 21,135 Government −1.11
COTE D’IVOIRE 2000 Tripartite −1.19
BHUTAN 1999 9 none 39 Government −1.27
PAKISTAN 2000 1.4 26.4 776 Tripartite −1.43
BELIZE 2000 28.2 65 Tripartite n.a.
Sources: World Development Indicators, Kaufmann et al. (2002), ISSA (1997), and country
sources.
Note: For Canada, Japan, and Sweden, reserve figure is only for new scheme.
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